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Abstract
I argue that, on the subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability, “it from bit” requires a gener-
alization of probability theory. This does not get us all the way to the quantum probability rule because
an extra constraint, known as noncontextuality, is required. I outline the prospects for a derivation of
noncontextuality within this approach and argue that it requires a realist approach to physics, or “bit
from it”. I then explain why this does not conflict with “it from bit”. This version of the essay includes
an addendum responding to the open discussion that occurred on the FQXi website. It is otherwise
identical to the version submitted to the contest.
1 Wheeler’s “it from bit”
It from bit. Otherwise put, every it—every particle, every field of force, even the spacetime
continuum itself—derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely—even if in some
contexts indirectly—from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes or no questions, binary choices,
bits.
It from bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom—at a very
deep bottom, in most instances—an immaterial source and explanation; that what we call reality
arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-
evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is
a participatory universe.
— J. A. Wheeler [1]
John Wheeler’s “it from bit” is a thesis about the foundations of quantum theory. It says that the things
that we usually think of as real—particles, fields and even spacetime—have no existence independent of the
questions that we ask about them. When a detector clicks it is not registering something that was there
independently of the experiment. Rather, the very act of setting up the detector in a certain way—the choice
of question—is responsible for the occurrence of the click. It is only the act of asking questions that causes
the answers to come into being. This idea is perhaps best illustrated by Wheeler’s parable of the game of
twenty questions (surprise version).
You recall how it goes—one of the after-dinner party sent out of the living room, the others
agreeing on a word, the one fated to be a questioner returning and starting his questions. “Is it
a living object?” “No.” “Is it here on earth?” “Yes.” So the questions go from respondent to
respondent around the room until at length the word emerges: victory if in twenty tries or less;
otherwise, defeat.
Then comes the moment when we are fourth to be sent from the room. We are locked out
unbelievably long. On finally being readmitted, we find a smile on everyone’s face, sign of a
joke or a plot. We innocently start our questions. At first the answers come quickly. Then each
question begins to take longer in the answering—strange, when the answer itself is only a simple
“yes” or “no.” At length, feeling hot on the trail, we ask, “Is the word ‘cloud’ ?” “Yes,” comes
the reply, and everyone bursts out laughing. When we were out of the room, they explain, they
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had agreed not to agree in advance on any word at all. Each one around the circle could respond
“yes” or “no” as he pleased to whatever question we put to him. But however he replied he had
to have a word in mind compatible with his own reply—and with all the replies that went before.
No wonder some of those decisions between “yes” and “no” proved so hard!
— J. A. Wheeler [2]
Wheeler proposed “it from bit” as a clue to help us answer the question “How come the quantum?”,
i.e. to derive the mathematical apparatus of quantum theory from a set of clear physical principles. In this
essay, I discuss whether “it from bit” implies the quantum probability rule, otherwise known as the Born
rule, which would get us part of the way towards answering Wheeler’s question.
My main argument is that, on the subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability, “it from bit” requires
a generalized probability theory. I explain why this is not ruled out by the common claim that classical
probability theory is not to be violated on pain of irrationality.
In the context of quantum theory, “it from bit” does not quite get us all the way to the Born rule
because the latter mandates a further constraint known as noncontextuality. The prospects for understanding
noncontextuality as a rationality requirement or an empirical addition are slim. Extra physical principles are
needed and I argue that these must be about the nature of reality, rather than the nature of our knowledge.
This seems to conflict with “it from bit” as it requires and agent-independent reality, suggesting “bit from
it”. I argue that there is no such conflict because the sense of “it” used in “it from bit” is different from the
sense used in “bit from it”.
2 The interpretation of probability
Since von Neumann’s work on quantum logic and operator algebras [3, 4], it has been known that quantum
theory can be viewed as a generalization of probability theory [5, 6]. If we want to understand what this
tells us about the nature of reality then we will need to adopt a concrete theory of how probabilities relate to
the world, which is the job of an interpretation of probability theory1. Three main classes of interpretation
have arisen to meet this need: frequentism (probability is long run relative frequency), epistemic probability
(probabilities represent the knowledge, information, or beliefs of a decision making agent), and objective
chance (probabilities represent a kind of law of nature or a disposition for a system to act in a certain way).
Getting into the details of all these options would take us too far afield, but a few comments are in order
to explain why adopting my preferred epistemic interpretation, known as subjective Bayesianism2, is not a
crazy thing to do.
Frequentism is still popular amongst physicists, but it has largely been abandoned by scholars of the phi-
losophy of probability. It is not able to handle single-case probabilities, e.g. the probability that civilization
will be destroyed by a nuclear war, and it leads to a bizarre reading of the law of large numbers that does
not do the explanatory work required of it3. A common position in the philosophy of probability is that
subjective Bayesianism is more satisfactory, but that it needs to be backed up by some theory of objective
chance in order to account for probabilistic laws4. My own view is that subjective Bayesianism suffices on
its own, but whether or not one believes in objective chance is irrelevant for the present discussion, since
objective chances need to be connected to epistemic probabilities in some way in order to explain how we
can come to know statistical laws. The usual way of doing this is via David Lewis’ principal principle [13].
One of the implications of this is that objective chances must have the same mathematical structure as
subjective Bayesian probabilities. Therefore, if we can argue that “it from bit” requires a modification of
subjective Bayesian probability then the same will apply to objective chances as well. It is also worth noting
that several modern interpretations of quantum theory adopt subjective Bayesianism, including “Quantum
Bayesianism” [14, 15, 16, 17] and the Deutsch-Wallace variant of many-worlds [18, 19, 20, 21] amongst others
[22].
1See [7] for an accessible introduction and [8] for a collection of key papers.
2Subjective Bayesianism has its origins in [9, 10]. An accessible introduction is [11].
3See [12] for a critique of frequentism in statistics.
4This view originates with David Lewis [13].
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3 Subjective Bayesian probability
Subjective Bayesianism says that probabilities represent the degrees of belief of a decision making agent,
who is conventionally described in the second person as “you”. Degrees of belief are measured by looking
at your behaviour, e.g. your willingness to enter into bets. The claim is that if you do not structure your
beliefs according to the axioms of probability theory then you are irrational. There are various ways of
deriving this, differing in their simplicity and sophistication. For ease of exposition, I base my discussion on
the simplest approach, known as the Dutch book argument.
The Dutch book argument defines your degree of belief in the occurrence of an uncertain event E as the
value $p(E) you consider to be a fair price for a lottery ticket that pays $1 if E occurs and nothing if it
does not. “Fair price” here means that you would be prepared to buy or sell any number of these tickets
at that price and that you would be prepared to do this in combination with fair bets on arbitrary sets of
other events. Your degrees of belief are said to be irrational if a malicious bookmaker can force you to enter
into a system of bets that would cause you to lose money whatever the outcome, despite the fact that you
consider them all fair. Otherwise, your degrees of belief are said to be rational. The Dutch book argument
then shows that your degrees of belief are rational if, and only if, they satisfy the usual axioms of probability
theory. These axioms are:
• Background framework: There is a set Ω, called the sample space, containing the most fine-grained
events you might be asked to bet on, e.g. if you are betting on the outcome of a dice roll then
Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. In general, an event is a subset of Ω, e.g. the event that the dice roll comes out
odd is {1, 3, 5}. For simplicity, we assume that Ω is finite. The set of events forms a Boolean algebra,
which just means that it supports the usual logical notions of AND, OR and NOT.
• A1: For all events E ⊆ Ω, 0 ≤ p(E) ≤ 1.
• A2: For the certain event Ω, p(Ω) = 1.
• A3: If E ∩ F = ∅, i.e. E and F cannot both happen together, then p(E ∪ F ) = p(E) + p(F ), where
E ∪ F means the event that either E or F occurs.
For illustrative purposes, here is the part of the argument showing that violations of A1 and A2 are
irrational. Consider an event E and suppose contra A1 that p(E) < 0. This means that you would be
willing to sell a lottery ticket that pays out on E to the bookie for a negative amount of money, i.e. you
would pay her $p(E) to take the ticket off your hands. Now, if E occurs you will have to pay the bookie $1
so in total you will have paid her $1+ p(E), and if E does not occur you will have paid her a total of $p(E).
Either way, you will lose money so having negative degrees of belief is irrational. A similar argument shows
that having degrees of belief larger than 1 is irrational. Now suppose contra A2 that p(Ω) < 1. Then, you
would be prepared to sell the lottery ticket for $p(Ω) and pay out $1 if Ω occurs. However, since Ω is certain
to occur, you will always end up paying out, which leaves you with a loss.
4 Is probability theory normative?
Based on this kind of argument, many subjective Bayesians regard probability theory as akin to propositional
logic5. In logic, you start with a set of premises that you regard as true, and then you use the rules of logic
to figure out what other propositions must be true or false as a consequence. If you fail to abide by those
truth values then there is an inconsistency in your reasoning. However, there is nothing in logic that tells
you what premises you have to start with. The premises are simply the input to the problem and logic tells
you what else they compel you to believe. Similarly, subjective probability does not tell you what numerical
value you must assign to any uncertain event6, but given some of those values as input, it tells you what
5For example, see [23] where this argument is made repeatedly.
6This is where it differs from objective Bayesianism [24], which asserts that there is a unique rational probability that you
ought to assign. However, defining such a unique probability is problematic at best.
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values you must assign to other events on pain of inconsistency, the inconsistency here being exposed in
the form of a sure loss. Like logic, subjective Bayesians regard probability theory as normative rather than
descriptive, i.e. they claim that you should structure your degrees of belief about uncertain events according
to probability theory if you aspire to be ideally rational, but not that humans actually do structure their
beliefs in this way. In fact, much research shows that they do not [25].
The normative view of probability theory presents a problem if we want to view quantum theory as
generalized probability because it implies that it is irrational to use anything other than conventional prob-
ability theory to reason about uncertain events. Fortunately, the normative view is not just wrong, but
obviously wrong. Unlike logic, it is easy to come up with situations in which the Dutch book argument has
no normative force. Because of this, the idea that it might happen in quantum theory too is not particularly
radical.
For example, the Dutch book argument requires that you view the fair price for selling a lottery ticket
to be the same as the fair price for buying it. In reality, people are more reluctant to take on risk than they
are to maintain a risk for which they have already paid the cost. Therefore, the fair selling price might be
higher than the fair buying price. This leads to the more general theory of upper and lower probabilities
wherein degrees of belief are represented by intervals on the real line rather than precise numerical values
[26].
At this point, I should address the fact that the Dutch book argument is not the only subjective Bayesian
derivation of probability theory, so its defects may not be shared with the other derivations. The most general
subjective arguments for probability theory are formulated in the context of decision theory, with Savage’s
axioms being the most prominent example [27]. These take account of things like the fact that you may be
risk averse and your appreciation of money is nonlinear, e.g. $1 is worth more to a homeless person than a
billionaire, so they replace the financial considerations of the Dutch book argument with the more general
concept of “utility”. However, what all these arguments have in common is that they are hedging strategies.
They start with some set of uncertain events and then they introduce various decision scenarios that you
could be faced with where the consequences depend on uncertain events in some way, e.g. the prizes in a
game that depends on dice rolls. Importantly, these arguments only work if the set of decision scenarios is
rich enough. They ask you to consider situations in which the prizes for the various outcomes are chopped
up and exchanged with each other in various ways. For example, in the Dutch book argument this comes in
the form of the idea that you must be prepared to buy or sell arbitrarily many tickets for arbitrary sets of
events at the fair price. The arguments then conclude that if you do not structure your beliefs according to
probability theory then there is some decision scenario in which you would be better off had you done so and
none in which you would be worse off. However, in real life, it is rather implausible that you would be faced
with such a rich set of decision scenarios. More often, you know something in advance about what decisions
you are going to be faced with. This is why decision theoretic arguments are hedging strategies. They start
from a situation in which you do not know what decisions you are going to be faced with and then they ask
you to consider the worst possible scenario. If you know for sure that this scenario is not going to come up
then the arguments have no normative force.
As an example, consider the following scenario. There is a coin that is going to be flipped exactly once.
You have in your possession $1 and you are going to be forced to bet that dollar on whether the coin will
come up heads or tails, with a prize of $2 if you get it right. You do not have the option of not placing a bet.
How should you structure your beliefs about whether the coin will come up heads or tails? If the decision
theoretic arguments applied then we would be forced to say that you must come up with a precise numerical
value for the probability of heads p(H). However, it is clear that the cogitation involved in coming up with
this number is completely pointless in this scenario. All you need to know is the answer to a single question.
Do you think heads is more likely to come up than tails? Your decision is completely determined by this
answer, which is just a single bit of information rather than a precise numerical value.
It should be clear from this that the decision theoretic arguments are not as strongly normative as the
laws of logic. Instead they are conditionally normative, i.e. normative if the decision scenarios envisaged in
the argument are all possible.
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5 “It from bit” implies a generalized probability theory
A universe that obeys “it from bit” is a universe in which not all conceivable decision scenarios are possible.
To explain this, consider again Wheeler’s parable of twenty questions (surprise version) and imagine that
you are observing the game passively, placing bets with a bookmaker on the side as it proceeds. To make
things more analogous to quantum theory, imagine that the respondents exit the room as soon as they have
answered their question, never to be heard from again. We might imagine that they are sent through a
wormhole into a region of spacetime that will forever be outside of our observable universe and that the
wormhole promptly closes as soon as they enter it. This rules out the possibility that we might ask them
about what they would have answered if they had been asked a different question, since in quantum theory
we generally cannot find out what the outcome of a measurement that we did not actually make would have
been.
Suppose that, at some point in the game, you make a bet with the bookie that the object that the fifth
respondent has in mind is a dove. However, what actually happens is that the questioner asks “Is it white?”
and the answer comes back “yes”, whereupon the fifth respondent is whisked off to the far corners of the
universe. Now, although the answer “yes” is consistent with the object being a dove, this is not enough to
resolve the bet as there are plenty of other conceivable white objects. As in Wheeler’s story, suppose that
the last question asked is “Is it a cloud?” and that the answer comes back “yes”. In the usual version of
twenty questions this would be enough to resolve the bet in the bookie’s favor because all the respondents
are thinking of a common object. However, in the surprise version this is not the case. It could well be
that “dove” was consistent with all the answers given so far at the time we made the bet, and that the fifth
respondent was actually thinking of a dove. We can never know and so the bet can never be resolved. It has
to be called off and you should get a refund.
Whilst the bet described above is unresolvable, other bets are still jointly resolvable, e.g. a bet on whether
the fifth respondent was thinking of a white object together with a bet on whether the last respondent was
thinking of a cloud. The set of bets that is jointly resolvable depends on the sequence of questions that is
actually asked by the questioner. If you want to develop a hedging strategy ahead of time, then you need to
consider all possible sequences of questions that might be asked to ensure that you cannot be forced into a
sure loss for any of them.
For the subjective Bayesian, the main lesson of this is that, in general, only certain subsets of all possible
bets are jointly resolvable. Define a betting context to be a set of events such that bets on all of them are
jointly resolvable and to which no other event can be added without violating this condition. It is safe to
assume that each betting context is a Boolean algebra, since, if we can find out whether E occurred at
the same time as finding out whether F occurred, then we can also determine whether they both occurred,
whether either one of them occurred, and whether they failed to occur, so we can define the usual logical
notions of AND, OR and NOT. However, unlike in conventional probability theory, there need not be a
common algebra on which all of the events that occur in different betting contexts are jointly defined.
Because of this, the Dutch book argument has normative force within a betting context, but it does not tell
us how probabilities should be related across different contexts. Therefore, our degrees of belief should be
represented by a set of probability distributions p(E|B), one for each betting context B7.
This framework can be applied to quantum theory where the betting contexts represent sets of measure-
ments that can be performed together at the same time. The details of this are rather technical, so they
are relegated to appendix A. The probabilities that result from this are more general than those allowed by
quantum theory. To get uniquely down to the Born rule, we need an extra constraint, known as noncontex-
tuality. This says that there are certain pairs of events from different betting contexts, E ∈ B and F ∈ B′,
that must always be assigned the same probability p(E|B) = p(F |B′). Therefore, we need to explain how
such additional constraints can be understood.
7Despite the notation, p(E|B) is not a conditional probability distribution because there need not be a common algebra on
which all the events are defined. Some authors do not consider this to be a generalization of probability theory [28, 21], since
all we are saying is that we have a bunch of probability distributions rather than just one. However, such systems can display
nonclassical features such as violations of Bell inequalities and no-cloning [29] so they are worthy of the name “generalization”
if anything is.
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6 Noncontextuality in subjective Bayesianism
One option is that noncontextuality could simply be posited as an additional fundamental principle. Previous
Dutch book arguments for the Born rule have done essentially this [14, 22]. However, subjective Bayesians
do not accept fundamental constraints on probabilities beyond those required by rationality. Imposing such
constraints would be like saying that you are allowed to construct a logical argument providing one of your
starting premises is “the car is red”, but if you start from “the car is yellow” then any argument you make is
logically invalid. Additional constraints on probabilities are contingent facts about your state of belief, just
as logical premises are contingent facts about the world. Therefore, noncontextuality needs to be derived in
some way.
One possibility is that noncontextuality follows from logical equivalence, i.e. if quantum theory always
assigns the same probability to E in context B and F in B′ then these should be regarded as equivalent
logical statements, in the same sense that E and NOT(NOTE) are equivalent in a Boolean algebra8. Logical
equivalence implies that it ought to be possible to construct a Dutch book that results in a sure loss if
p(E|B) 6= p(F |B′). This can only be done if you are willing to accept that the occurrence of E in betting
context B makes it necessary that F would have occurred had the betting context been B′ and vice versa.
If this is the case, then you will agree that a bet made on F in betting context B′ should also pay out if
the betting context was in fact B and the event E occurred and vice versa. If this is the case, then the
bookie can construct a Dutch book against p(E|B) < p(F |B′) by buying a ticket from you that pays out
on E and selling a ticket that pays out on F . The payouts on these tickets will be the same, so you will
lose money in this transaction. By exchanging the roles of E and F , there would be a Dutch book against
p(E|B) > p(F |B′) as well.
This strategy hinges on whether it is reasonable to make counterfactual assertions, i.e. assertions about
what would have happened had the betting context been different. However, “it from bit” declares such
counterfactuals meaningless because it says that there is no answer to questions that have not been asked.
Even if we do not accept “it from bit”, the Kochen-Specker theorem [30] implies that counterfactual assertions
cannot all respect noncontextuality, i.e. there would have to be pairs of events E ∈ B and F ∈ B′ such
that if E occurs in B then F would not have occurred in B′ even though quantum theory asserts that
p(E|B) = p(F |B′) always holds. We conclude that noncontextuality of probability assignments cannot be a
rationality requirement.
Another possibility is that noncontextuality could be adopted simply because we have performed many
quantum experiments and have always observed relative frequencies in accord with the Born rule. Although
probabilities are not identified with relative frequencies in subjective Bayesianism, it still offers an account
of statistical inference wherein observing relative frequencies causes probabilities to be updated. If certain
technical conditions hold, probability assignments will converge to the observed relative frequency in the
limit of a large number of trials. Therefore, we could assert that noncontextuality is a brute empirical fact9.
The problem with this is that it provides no explanation of why noncontextuality holds. If we accept this,
we might as well just give up and say that the only reason why we believe any physical theory is because
it matches the observed relative frequencies. It would be like saying that the reason why the Maxwell-
Boltzmann distribution applies to a box of gas is because we have sampled many molecules from such boxes
and always found them to be approximately Maxwell-Boltzmann distributed. This belies the important
explanatory role of stationary distributions in equilibrium statistical mechanics, and would be of no help
in understanding why nonequilibrium systems tend to equilibrium. Similarly, the Born rule appears to be
playing an important structural role in quantum theory that calls for an explanation.
The remaining option is to view noncontextuality as arising from physical, as opposed to logical, equiv-
alence. The Dutch book rationality criterion is usually expressed as the requirement that you should not
enter into bets that lead to a sure loss by logical necessity, but it is equally irrational to enter into a bet
that you believe will lead to a sure loss, whether or not that belief is a logical necessity. Because of this, the
argument that you should assign probability one to the certain event equally applies to events that you only
8Pitowsky attempts to argue along these lines [22], unsuccessfully in my view.
9This has been suggested in the context of the many-worlds interpretation [28].
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believe to be certain, regardless of whether that belief is correct. Now, belief in the laws of physics entails
certainty about statements that follow from the laws so this can be the origin of constraints on probability
assignments.
To illustrate, suppose you believe that Newtonian mechanics is true and that there is a single particle
system with a given Hamiltonian. This means that you are committed to propositions of the form “If the
particle initially occupies phase space point (x0, p0) then at time t it occupies the solution to Hamilton’s
equations (x(t), p(t)) with initial condition (x0, p0)”. If you bet on such propositions at anything more or less
than even odds then you believe that you will lose money with certainty. Importantly, this type of argument
can also imply constraints on events that you are not certain about. For example, if you assign a phase space
region some probability and then compute the endpoints of the trajectories for all points in that region at
a later time then the region formed by the end points must be assigned the same probability at that later
time. This shows that the need to assign equal probabilities to different events can sometimes be derived
from the laws of physics.
Crucially, this sort of argument can only really be made to work if there is an objectively existing
external reality. There needs to be some sort of “quantum stuff” such that events that are always assigned
the same probability correspond to physically equivalent states of this stuff. In the context of the many-
worlds interpretation, the Deutsch-Wallace [18, 19, 20, 21] and Zurek [31, 32] derivations of the Born rule
are arguments of this type, where the quantum stuff is simply the wavefunction.
7 “It from bit” or “bit from it”?
We have arrived at the conclusion that noncontextuality must be derived in terms of an analysis of the things
that objectively exist. This implies a realist view of physics, or in other words “bit from it”, which seems to
conflict with “it from bit”. Fortunately, this conflict is only apparent because “it” is being used in different
senses in “it from bit” and “bit from it”. The things that Wheeler classifies as “it” are things like particles,
fields and spacetime. They are things that appear in the fundamental ontology of classical physics and hence
are things that only appear to be real from our perspective as classical agents. He does not mention things
like wavefunctions, subquantum particles, or anything of that sort. Thus, there remains the possibility that
reality is made of quantum stuff and that the interaction of this stuff with our question asking apparatus,
also made of quantum stuff, is what causes the answers (particles, fields, etc.) to come into being. “It from
bit” can be maintained in this picture provided the answers depend not only on the state of the system
being measured, but also on the state of the stuff that comprises the measuring apparatus. Thus, we would
end up with “it from bit from it”, where the first “it” refers to classical ontology and the second refers to
quantum stuff.
8 Conclusion
On the subjective Bayesian view, “it from bit” implies that probability theory needs to be generalized,
which is in accord with the observation that quantum theory is a generalized probability theory. However,
“it from bit” does not get us all the way to the quantum probability rule. A subjective Bayesian analysis of
noncontextuality indicates that it can only be derived within a realist approach to physics. At present, this
type of derivation has only been carried out in the many-worlds interpretation, but I expect it can be made
to work in other realist approaches to quantum theory, including those yet to be discovered.
9 Addendum
In editing this essay for publication, I wanted to hew as closely as possible to the version submitted to the
contest, so I have decided to address the discussion that occurred on the FQXi website in this addendum.
I also address some comments made by Kathryn Laskey in private correspondence, because I think she
addressed one of the issues particularly eloquently. I am grateful to my colleagues and co-entrants for their
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thoughtful comments. It would be impossible to address all of them here, so I restrict attention to some of
the most important and frequently raised issues. Further details can be found on the FQXi comment thread
[33].
9.1 Noncontextuality
Both Jochen Szangolies and Ian Durham expressed confusion at my usage of the term “noncontextual-
ity”, which derives from Gleason’s theorem [34]. Due to the Kochen-Specker theorem [30], it is often said
that quantum theory is “contextual”, so how can this be reconciled with my claim that the Born rule is
“noncontextual”?
In Gleason’s theorem, noncontextuality means that the same probability should be assigned to the same
projection operator, regardless of the context that it is measured in. Here, by context, I mean the other
projection operators that are measured simultaneously. So, as in the example given in the technical endnotes,
|2〉 should receive the same probability regardless of whether it is measured as part of the basis {|0〉, |1〉, |2〉}
or the basis {|+〉, |−〉, |2〉}, where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). From the perspective of this essay, Gleason’s theorem
says that, for Hilbert spaces of dimension three or larger, the only probability assignments compatible with
both the Dutch book constraints and noncontextuality are those given by the Born rule. In this sense the
Born rule is “noncontextual” and indeed it is the only viable probability rule that is.
On the other hand, the Kochen-Specker theorem concerns the assignment of definite values to the out-
comes of measurements. Instead of assigning probabilities to projectors, the aim is to assign them values
0 or 1 in such a way that, for any set of orthogonal projectors that can occur together in a measurement,
exactly one of them gets the value 1. This is to be done noncontextually, which means that whatever value
a projector is assigned in one measurement context, it must be assigned the same value in all other contexts
in which it occurs. The Kochen-Specker theorem says that this cannot be done.
The two theorems are related because 0 and 1 are examples of probability assignments, albeit extremal
ones. As first pointed out by Bell [35], Gleason’s theorem actually implies the conclusion of the Kochen-
Specker theorem by the following argument. For any quantum state, the Born rule never assigns 0/1
probabilities to every single projector. Gleason’s theorem implies that, in dimension three and higher, the
only noncontextual probability assignments are given by the Born rule. Therefore, for these dimensions,
there can be no noncontextual probability assignment that only assigns 0/1 probabilities.
From this it should be apparent that the noncontextuality assumption of the Kochen-Specker theorem is
the same as in Gleason’s theorem, only that it is specialized to 0/1 probability assignments. The additional
assumption that the probabilities must be either 0 or 1 is called outcome determinism, so the Kochen-Specker
theorem shows that it is impossible to satisfy both outcome determinism and noncontextuality at the same
time (in addition to the Dutch book constraints).
Based on this, people often loosely say that the Kochen-Specker theorem shows that quantum theory
is “contextual” and this is the source of the confusion. However, adopting contextual value assignments is
only one way of resolving the contradiction entailed by the Kochen-Specker theorem, the other being to drop
outcome determinism. It is therefore perfectly consistent to say that the Born rule is noncontextual but that
any model that assigns definite values to every observable cannot be.
9.2 Scientific realism
Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories should be thought of as describing an objective
reality that exists independently of us. My argument ends up endorsing the realist position, as it concludes
that the world must be made of some objectively existing “quantum stuff”.
There are good a priori reasons for believing in scientific realism that are independent of the specifics of
quantum theory, and hence independent of the argument given in this essay (see [36] for a summary and
[37] for a more detailed treatment of these arguments). Most people who believe in scientific realism are
probably swayed by these arguments rather than anything to do with the details of quantum theory.
As pointed out by Ken Wharton, this would seem to open the possibility of short-circuiting my argument.
Why not simply make the case for scientific realism via one or more of the a priori arguments? From this it
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follows that the world must consist of some objectively existing stuff, and hence “bit from it”.
Whilst I agree that this is a valid line of argument, my intention was not to provide an argument that
would convince realists, for whom “bit from it” is a truism. It is evident from the popularity of interpretations
of quantum theory that draw inspiration from the Copenhagen interpretation, which I collectively call neo
Copenhagen interpretations, that not everyone shares such strong realist convictions. Wheeler’s “it from
bit” is usually read as a neo-Copenhagen principle. It says that what we usually call reality derives from the
act of making measurements rather than from something that exists independently of us. As I argue in the
essay, “it from bit” can be given a more realist spin by interpreting “it” as referring to an emergent, effective
classical reality rather than to the stuff that the world is made of at the fundamental level. Nevertheless,
most endorsers of “it from bit” are likely to have the neo Copenhagen take on it in mind.
The most effective way of arguing against any opponent is to start from their own premises and show
that they lead to the position they intend to oppose. This is much more effective than arguing against their
premises on a priori grounds as it is evident from the fact that they have chosen those premises that the
opponent does not find such a priori arguments compelling. My aim here is to do this with “it from bit”—a
premise accepted by many neo Copenhagenists—and to argue that it needs to be supplemented with realism,
or “bit from it”, in order to obtain a compelling derivation of the Born rule. This presents a greater challenge
to the neo Copenhagen view than simply rehashing the existing arguments for realism. I expect my fellow
realists to find this line of argument overly convoluted, but it is not really aimed at them.
9.3 Has probability theory really been generalized?
In this essay, I argued that “it from bit” requires a generalization of probability theory. Specifically, I argued
that there are a number of different betting contexts B1,B2, . . ., that within each betting context the Dutch
book argument implies a well defined probability measure over the Boolean algebra of events in that context,
but that it does not imply any constraints on events across different betting contexts. This gives rise to
a theory in which there are a number of different Boolean algebras, each of which has its own probability
measure, instead of there being just one probability measure over a single Boolean algebra. Giacomo Mauro
D’Ariano, Howard Barnum and Kathryn Laskey (the latter in private correspondence) questioned whether
it is really necessary to think of this as a generalization of probability theory.
D’Ariano’s method for preserving probability theory is to assign probabilities to the betting contexts
themselves. That is, we can build a sample space of the form (B1 × ΩB1 ,B2 × ΩB2 , . . .), where ΩBj is the
sample space associated with betting context Bj. We can then just specify an ordinary probability measure
over this larger space, and the separate probability measures for each context would then be obtained by
conditioning on Bj .
I admit that this can always be done formally, but conceptually one might not want to regard betting
contexts as the kind of thing that should be assigned probabilities. They are defined by the sequences of
questions that we decide to ask, so one might want to regard them as a matter of “free choice”. To avoid
the thorny issue of free will, we can alternatively imagine that the betting context is determined by an
adversary. Recall that, for a subjective Bayesian, assigning a probability to an event means being willing to
bet on that event at certain odds. Therefore, assigning probabilities to betting contexts means you should
be willing to bet on which context will occur. However, if the bookie is also the person who gets to choose
the betting context after all such bets are laid, then she can always do so in such a way as to make your
probability assignments to the betting contexts as inaccurate as possible. Therefore, there are at least some
circumstances under which it would not be meaningful to assign probabilities to betting contexts.
Laskey’s response is quite different. She simply denies that what I have described deserves the name
“generalization of probability theory”. Since her comments were made in private communication, with her
permission I reproduce them here.
Let me first take issue with your statement that quantum theory requires generalizing proba-
bility theory because the Boolean algebras of outcomes are different in different betting contexts.
Dependence of the Boolean algebra of outcomes on the betting context is by no means restricted
to quantum theory. It happens all the time in classical contexts – in fact, it’s a fixture of our
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daily life. Ever see the movie “Sliding Doors”? The Boolean algebra of outcomes I face today
would be totally different had I not chosen to marry my husband; had I taken a different job
when I came out of grad school; had my husband and I not had four children; had I not chosen
an academic career; had I not put myself into a position in which other people depend on me to
put food on the table; or any number of other might-have-beens in my life.
Consider, for example, a town facing the question of whether to zone a given area for residential
development or to put a wind farm there. If the town chooses residential development, we might
have, for example, a probability distribution over a Boolean algebra of values of the average
square footage of homes in the area. There would be no such Boolean algebra if we build the
wind farm. (I am specifically considering averages because they are undefined when N is zero.) If
we choose the wind farm, we would have a distribution over the average daily number of kilowatt
hours of wind-powered electricity generated by the wind farm. There would be no such Boolean
algebra if we choose the residential development. What is the intrinsic difference between this
situation and the case of a quantum measurement, in which the algebra of post-measurement
states depends on the experiment the scientist chooses to conduct?
Just about any time we make a decision, the Boolean algebra of possible future states of
the world is different for each choice we might make. Decision theorists are accustomed to
this dependence of possible outcomes on the decision. It does not mean we need to generalize
probability theory. It simply means we have a different Boolean algebra conditional on some
contexts than conditional on others.
In some ways this is a matter of semantics. I argue in the essay that the breakdown of some of the usual
conventions of probability theory is commonplace and should not be surprising. We just disagree on whether
this deserves the name “generalization”.
My argument for a generalization of probability theory is mainly directed against dogmatic Bayesians
who endorse the view that ordinary probability theory on a single Boolean algebra is not to be violated
on pain of irrationality. There are plenty of dogmatic Bayesians still around. If modern Bayesians have
a more relaxed attitude then that is all to the good as far as I am concerned. However, I do think it is
worth making the argument specifically in the context of physics, as physicists are often a bit timid about
drawing implications for the foundations of probability from their subject, and I do not think they should
be if violations of the standard framework are commonplace.
I therefore do not wish to spill too much ink over whether or not the bare-bones theory of multiple
Boolean algebras should be called a generalization of probability theory. However, quantum theory has
much more structure than this, in the form of Hilbert space structure and the noncontextuality requirement.
For me, the more important question is whether quantum theory should be viewed as a generalization of
probability theory.
9.4 Must quantum theory be viewed as a generalization of probability theory?
The short answer to this is no. The underdetermination of theory by evidence implies that there will always
be several ways of formulating a theory that are empirically equivalent. We can always apply D’Ariano’s
trick or take Laskey’s view, since they apply to any set of probabilities on separate Boolean algebras, and
quantum theory is just a restriction on that set. Therefore, I cannot argue that it is a logical necessity to
view quantum theory as a generalized probability theory, but I can argue that it is more elegant, simpler,
productive, etc. to do so.
As an analogy, note that it is also not logically necessary to view special relativity as ruling the existence
of a luminiferous ether. Instead, one can posit that there exists an ether, that it picks out a preferred frame
of reference in which it is stationary, but that forces act upon objects in such a way to make it impossible
to detect motion relative to the ether, e.g. they cause bodies moving relative to the ether to contract in
just such a way as to mimic relativistic length contraction. This theory makes the exact same predictions
as special relativity and is often called the Lorentz ether theory10. Special relativity is normally regarded
10It is similar to the theory in which Lorentz first derived his eponymous transformations, although, unlike the theory
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as superior to the Lorentz ether theory because the latter seems to require a weird conspiracy of forces in
order to protect the existence of an entity that cannot be observed. The former has proved to be a much
better guide to the future development of physics. What I want to argue is that not adopting a view in
which quantum theory is a generalization of probability theory is analogous to adopting the Lorentz ether
theory, i.e. it is consistent but a poor guide to the future progress of physics.
When we add Hilbert spaces and noncontextuality into the mix, Gleason’s theorem implies that our beliefs
can be represented by a density operator ρ on Hilbert space, at least if the Hilbert space is of dimension
three of higher. I have argued elsewhere that regarding the density operator as a true generalization of a
classical probability distribution leads to an elegant theory which unifies a lot of otherwise disparate quantum
phenomena [38]. Here, I will confine myself to a different argument, based on the quantum notion of entropy.
Classically, the entropy of a probability distribution p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) over a finite space is given by
H(p)−
∑
j
pj log pj. (1)
Up to a multiplicative constant, this describes both the Shannon (information theoretic) entropy and the
Gibbs (thermodynamic) entropy. In other words, it describes the degree of compressibility of a string of
digits drawn from independent instances of the probability distribution p and also quantifies the amount
of heat that must be dissipated in a thermodynamic transformation. In quantum theory, the entropy of a
density operator is given by the von Neumann entropy,
S(ρ) = −Tr (ρ log ρ) , (2)
which is the natural way of generalizing the classical entropy if you think of density operators as the quantum
generalization of probability distributions. It turns out that this plays the same role in quantum theory as
the classical entropy does in classical theories, i.e. it is both the information theoretic entropy, quantifying
the compressibility of quantum states drawn from a source described by ρ, and it is the thermodynamic
entropy, quantifying the heat dissipation in a thermodynamic transformation.
Now, this definition of quantum entropy only really makes sense on the view that density operators are
generalized probability measures. What would we get if we took D’Ariano or Laskey’s views instead?
On D’Ariano’s view we have a well-defined classical probability distribution, just over a larger space that
includes the betting contexts. If this is just an ordinary classical probability distribution then arguably we
should just use the formula for the classical entropy, although one might want to marginalize over the betting
contexts first. This is not the von Neumann entropy, and it does not seem to quantify anything of relevance
to quantum information or thermodynamics.
On Laskey’s view we just have a bunch of unrelated probability distributions over different betting
contexts. Should we take the entropy of just one of these and, if so, which one? None of them seems
particularly preferred. Should we take some kind of weighted average of all of them and, if so, what motivates
the weighting given that betting contexts are not assigned probabilities? Arguably the only relevant betting
context is the one we actually end up in, so one should just apply the classical entropy formula to this
context, but this is unlikely to match the von Neumann entropy11.
Now admittedly, there is probably some convoluted way of getting to the von Neumann entropy in
these other approaches, just as there is a way of understanding the Lorentz transformations in the Lorentz
ether theory, but I expect that it would look ad hoc compared to treating density operators as generalized
probability distributions.
In summary, I am arguing that quantum theory should be regarded as a bona fide generalization of
probability theory, not out of logical necessity, but because doing so gives the right quantum generalizations
of classical concepts. People who view things in this way are liable to make more progress in quantum
information theory, quantum thermodynamics, and beyond, than those who do not. In this sense I think
the situation is analogous to adopting special relativity over Lorentz ether theory.
described here, the actual theory proposed by Lorentz failed to agree with special relativity in full detail.
11It will match if we are lucky enough to choose the context that minimizes the classical entropy, but again there is no
motivation for doing this in Laskey’s approach.
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A Technical Endnotes
In general, a betting context B is a Boolean algebra, which we take to be finite for simplicity. All such algebras
are isomorphic to the algebra generated by the subsets of some finite set ΩB, where AND is represented by
set intersection, OR by union, and NOT by complement.
In quantum theory, a betting context corresponds to a set of measurements that can be performed
together that is as large as possible. A measurement is represented by a self-adjoint operatorM and all such
operators have a spectral decomposition of the form
M =
∑
j
λjΠj , (3)
with eigenvalues λj and orthogonal projection operators Πj that sum to the identity
∑
j Πj = I. The
eigenvalues are the possible measurement outcomes and, when the system is assigned the density operator
ρ, the Born rule states that the outcome λj is obtained with probability
p(λj) = Tr (Πjρ) . (4)
The eigenvalues just represent an arbitrary labelling of the measurement outcomes, so a measurement
can alternatively be represented by a set of orthogonal projection operators {Πj} that sum to the identity∑
j Πj = I, which is sometimes known as a Projection Valued Measure (PVM)
12.
Two PVMs A = {Πj} and B = {Π′j} can be measured together if and only if each of the projectors
commute, i.e. ΠjΠ
′
k = Π
′
kΠj for all j and k. If this is the case then ΠjΠ
′
k is also a projector and
∑
jk ΠjΠk =
I. Therefore, one way of performing the joint measurement is to measure the PVM C = {Π′′jk} with projectors
Π′′jk = ΠjΠ
′
k and, upon obtaining the outcome (jk), report the outcome j for A and k for B. This fine graining
procedure can be iterated by adding further commuting PVMs and forming the product of their elements
with those of C. The procedure terminates when the resulting PVM is as fine grained as possible and this
will happen when it consists of rank-1 projectors onto the elements of an orthonormal basis. The outcome
of any other commuting PVM is determined by coarse graining the projectors onto the orthonormal basis
elements.
Therefore, in quantum theory, we can take the sets ΩB that generate the betting contexts B to consist of
the elements of orthonormal bases. An event E ∈ B is then a subset of the basis elements and corresponds
to a projection operator ΠE =
∑
|ψ〉∈E |ψ〉〈ψ|. The Boolean operations on B can be represented in terms of
these projectors as
• Conjunction: G = EANDF ⇒ ΠG = ΠEΠF
• Disjunction: G = EORF ⇒ ΠG = ΠG + ΠF − ΠGΠF , which reduces to ΠG = ΠG + ΠF when
E ∩ F = ∅.
12More generally, we could work with Positive Operator Valued Measures (POVMs) or sets of consistent histories, but this
would not substantially change the arguments of this essay.
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• Negation: G = NOTE ⇒ ΠG = I −ΠE .
From the Dutch book argument applied within a betting context, we have that our degrees of belief
should be represented by a set of probability measures p(E|B) satisfying
• For any event E ⊆ ΩB, p(E|B) ≥ 0.
• For the certain events ΩB, p(ΩB|B) = 1
• For disjoint events within the same betting context E,F ⊆ ΩB, E ∩ F = ∅, p(E ∪ F |B) = p(E|B) +
p(F |B).
The Born rule is an example of such an assignment, and in this language it takes the form
p(E|B) = Tr (ΠEρ) . (5)
The Born rule also has the property that the probability only depends on the projector associated with
an event, and not on the betting context that it occurs in. For example, in a three dimensional Hilbert space,
consider the betting contexts ΩB = {|0〉, |1〉, |2〉} and ΩB′ = {|+〉, |−〉, |2〉}, where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). The
Born rule implies that p({|2〉}|B) = p({|2〉}|B′) and also that p({|0〉, |1〉}|B) = p({|+〉, |−〉}|B′) because, in
each case, the events correspond to the same projectors. The Dutch book argument alone does not imply
this because it does not impose any constraints across different betting contexts.
A probability assignment is called noncontextual if p(E|B) = p(F |B′) whenever ΠE = ΠF . Gleason’s
theorem [34] says that, in Hilbert spaces of dimension 3 or larger, noncontextual probability assignments
are exactly those for which there exists a density operator ρ such that p(E|B) = Tr (ΠEρ), i.e. they must
take the form of the Born rule. Therefore, the Born rule follows from the conjunction of the Dutch book
constraints and noncontextuality, at least in Hilbert spaces of dimension 3 or greater.
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